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Abstract 
This paper applies theories of international socialization to examine the impact of EU contact 
on the professional socialization of public officials in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on a 
survey of officials in seven new member states, the paper finds that daily work on EU issues 
is associated with favourable attitudes towards merit-based civil service governance. The 
distinction between types of EU contact shows that officials dealing with ‘reception’-related 
EU activities such as the transposition and implementation of EU policies develop more 
meritocratic attitudes. By contrast, ‘projection’-related activities that involve personal contact 
with EU officials have no effect. The paper concludes that the small but consistent impact of 
EU contact on professional socialization promotes the silent professionalization of public 
administration in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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Introduction		What	 is	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 on	 the	 professionalization	 of	 public	administration	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 countries	 (CEECs)?	 Research	 on	 the	Europeanization	of	public	administration	in	post-communist	CEECs	has	long	focused	on	the	 impact	of	EU	conditionality	(Camyar,	2010;	Dimitrova,	2005).	The	development	of	administrative	 capacity	 was	 one	 of	 the	 conditions	 for	 EU	 membership	 (Dimitrova,	2002).	 Proponents	 of	 EU	 conditionality	 stress	 a	 considerable	 degree	 of	 formal	institutional	 change	 such	 as	 the	 adoption	 and	 revision	 of	 civil	 service	 laws	 by	 CEEC	governments	 (Dimitrova,	 2005).	 In	 contrast,	 skeptics	 point	 to	 problems	 of	 ‘shallow	Europeanization’	 due	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 CEEC	 governments	 to	 properly	 implement	 the	new	 formal	 rules	 (Goetz,	 2005).	 Moreover,	 research	 into	 the	 post-accession	sustainability	of	administrative	 reforms	has	 identified	 risks	of	 reform	backsliding	and	the	persistence	of	 formal	 rules	as	 ‘empty	 shells’	 (Dimitrova,	2010;	Fink-Hafner,	2014;	Meyer-Sahling	2011).		This	 article	 develops	 an	 alternative	 perspective	 on	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 EU	 and	public	 administration	 in	 CEECs.	 It	 focuses	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 the	EU	on	 the	 professional	socialization	 of	 public	 officials	 in	 CEECs.	 Specifically,	 we	 examine	 the	 effect	 of	 EU	contact	 on	 the	 attitudes	 of	 public	 officials	 towards	 non-political,	 merit-based	 civil	service	governance.			The	establishment	of	meritocratic	civil	service	systems	has	been	at	the	center	of	debates	on	 the	 reform	 of	 public	 administration	 in	 CEECs.	 Both	 practitioners	 and	 academic	research	stress	 the	 importance	of	professional,	de-politicized	civil	 service	 systems	 for	the	successful	 implementation	of	EU	policies	at	the	national	 level	and	progress	during	
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the	EU	accession	process	(Falkner	and	Treib,	2008;	Hille	and	Knill,	2008;	OECD,	1999).		More	 generally,	 the	 quality	 of	 a	 country’s	 bureaucracy	 -	 in	 particular,	 recruitment	 on	merit	 and	 promotion	 of	 staff	 -	 is	 commonly	 regarded	 as	 essential	 for	 economic	development,	 the	 successful	 consolidation	 of	 democracy	 and	 the	 curbing	 of	 public	sector	 corruption	 (Dahlström	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Evans	 and	 Rauch,	 1999;	 Linz	 and	 Stepan,	1996).		Theoretically,	our	 study	builds	on	 the	 insights	of	 studies	of	 international	 socialization	(Checkel,	2005;	Risse	et	al.,	2013).	In	the	European	context,	this	research	has	examined	the	socializing	impact	of	EU	institutions	on	the	attitudes	of	national	and	supranational	officials	towards	modes	of	EU	governance	(Beyers,	2005,	2010;	Hooghe,	2005,	2012).1	In	relation	to	third	countries,	 theories	of	 international	socialization	have	been	applied	to	study	the	impact	of	EU	contact	on	democratic	attitude	change	among	state	officials	in	the	 Southern	 neighborhood	 of	 the	 EU	 (Freyburg,	 2011,	 2015).	 For	 CEECs,	 the	application	of	this	body	of	theory	has	focused	on	democratic	socialization	in	the	context	of	NATO	enlargement	(Flockhart,	2004;	Gheciu,	2005).			Our	 article	 shifts	 the	 focus	 of	 attention	 to	 the	 relation	 between	European	 integration	and	 professional	 socialization	 in	 public	 administration,	 which	 we	 understand	 as	 a	positive	attitude	change	of	public	officials	towards	merit-based	civil	service	governance	generated	 through	 EU	 contact.	 Focusing	 on	 EU	 contact	 in	 the	 work	 context,	 we	 first	examine	 the	 general	 EU	 influence	 on	 professional	 socialization	 by	 comparing	 public	officials	who	deal	with	EU	issues	on	a	daily	basis	and	those	who	do	not.	Subsequently,	we	examine	the	effect	of	different	 types	of	EU	contact	on	the	meritocratic	attitudes	of	public	officials	 in	order	 to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	 the	mechanisms	underlying	
 4 
EU-inspired	professional	socialization.				The	empirical	analysis	 is	based	on	a	survey	of	public	officials	employed	 in	 the	central	government	ministries	 of	 seven	 CEECs	 that	 joined	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 2004	Eastern	 enlargement.	 The	 dataset	 includes	 information	 regarding	 the	 careers,	 job	activities	and	evaluation	of	different	principles	of	civil	service	governance.			Our	analysis	shows	that	day-to-day	work	on	EU	issues	has	a	small	but	consistent	impact	on	the	professional	socialization	of	public	officials.	Looking	more	closely	at	the	type	of	EU	contact	that	matters	for	professional	socialization,	we	find	that	the	daily	application	of	EU	rules	and	procedures	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 transposition	and	 implementation	of	EU	policies	(so-called	‘reception’-related	EU	activities)	has	a	positive	effect	on	attitudes	towards	merit-based	civil	service	governance.	In	contrast,	direct,	inter-personal	contact	with	 officials	 from	 EU	 institutions	 and	 other	 member	 states	 (so-called	 ‘projection-related’	EU	activities)	does	not	appear	to	affect	officials’	meritocratic	attitudes.			The	positive	impact	of	EU	contact	on	professional	socialization	provides	an	alternative	perspective	on	the	relation	between	the	EU	and	public	administration.	Our	study	shifts	the	 focus	 of	 attention	 from	 the	 level	 of	 formal	 rules	 to	 the	 level	 of	 attitudes	 and,	 in	particular,	 from	 the	 level	 of	 countries	 to	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 public	 officials.	 It	therefore	 opens	 the	 debate	 around	 the	 micro-foundations	 of	 the	 Europeanization	 of	public	 administration	 in	 CEECs.	 Substantively,	 our	 findings	 raise	 the	 prospect	 that	public	officials	develop	more	meritocratic	attitudes	as	a	result	of	bringing	CEECs	closer	to	 the	EU.	Thanks	to	 integration	 into	the	European	Administrative	Space,	professional	socialization	 thus	 presents	 the	 potential	 to	 promote	 the	 silent	 professionalization	 of	
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public	administration	in	CEECs.			
The	professional	socialization	of	public	officials	in	CEECs		Mechanisms	 of	 socialization	 have	 remained	 largely	 unexplored	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Europeanization	 of	 public	 administration	 in	 CEECs.	 Checkel	 (2005:	 804)	 has	 defined	socialization	 as	 ‘a	 process	 of	 inducting	 actors	 into	 the	 norms	 and	 rules	 of	 a	 given	community’	(2005:	804).	For	him,	the	essence	of	socialization	is	a	change	in	the	logic	of	action	 from	 a	 logic	 of	 consequences	 to	 a	 logic	 of	 appropriateness.	 	 Checkel	 (2005)	argues	that	this	change	can	manifest	itself	in	two	ways.			First,	 type	 I	 socialization	 refers	 to	 role-playing	 when	 actors	 consciously	 accept	 the	norms	of	behavior	associated	with	a	given	situation	or	position	and	behave	accordingly.	Role-playing	assumes	that	actors	know	what	is	expected	from	them	and	they	choose	to	behave	 in	 the	 appropriate	 way.	 Second,	 type	 II	 assumes	 deeper	 socialization,	 in	 that	actors	are	persuaded	by	the	‘rightness’	of	a	norm	associated	with	a	given	position.	They	do	 not	 question	 their	 behavior	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 position	 nor	 do	 they	 need	 to	 think	much	about	what	 is	expected.	Rather,	 the	behavioral	expectation	has	acquired	 ‘taken-for-grantedness’	(Checkel,	2005).			In	 this	 article,	 we	 are	 mainly	 interested	 in	 type	 I	 socialization,	 which	 is	 especially	relevant	for	the	context	of	public	administration.	When	entering	public	administration,	officials	 in	most	 countries	 have	 to	 pass	 an	 entry	 examination,	 they	 receive	 induction	training	 and	 will	 receive	 an	 introduction	 to	 their	 specific	 job	 responsibilities.	 Such	training	 usually	 covers	 a	 range	 of	 general	 issues	 such	 as	 constitutional	 and	
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administrative	law,	the	budget	process,	civil	service	law,	and	the	rules	and	procedures	within	their	own	institution.			The	 steps	 and	 items	 covered	 during	 preparatory	 training	 aim	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	professional	 socialization	 of	 officials	 into	 public	 administration,	 as	 they	 learn	what	 is	expected	 from	 them	 as	 civil	 servants	 in	 their	 institution	 and	 specifically	within	 their	position.	Indeed,	the	very	notion	of	‘induction’	training	neatly	resonates	with	Checkel’s	(2005)	definition	of	socialization	provided	above.	As	civil	servants	perform	their	job	on	a	 day-to-day	 basis,	 they	 are	 then	 expected	 to	 routinize	 the	 application	 of	 rules	 and	procedures	expected	of	them	qua	their	position	as	a	public	official.			Throughout,	it	is	not	required	that	officials	progress	from	type	I	to	type	II	socialization	and	hence	 that	 they	develop	an	emotional	attachment	 to	 their	 job.	 It	 is	 sufficient	 that	they	understand	the	norms	and	rules	associated	with	their	job,	accept	them	and	behave	in	 accordance	with	 them.	To	paraphrase	Checkel	 (2005)	 and	Beyers	 (2005),	 they	 are	merely	required	to	play	a	role	in	their	job.			The	distinction	between	role-playing	and	internalization	(type	I	and	II	socialization)	is	well	 captured	 by	 conceptions	 of	 socialization	 as	 attitude	 change,	 which	 has	 recently	been	introduced	by	Freyburg	(2015)	to	the	debate	on	international	socialization.	Social	psychologists	commonly	distinguish	an	affective	and	a	cognitive	dimension	of	attitudes	(Eagly	and	Chaiken,	1993;	Smith	and	Mackie,	2007).	 	Internalization,	then,	emphasizes	affective	 attitude	 change,	 while	 role-playing	merely	 requires	 change	 on	 the	 cognitive	dimension	of	officials’	attitudes.	The	latter	implies	that	officials	are	subject	to	learning	
 7 
processes	which	expose	them	to	new	knowledge	and	subsequently	lead	to	a	change	in	attitudes	as	the	outcome	of	socialization.			This	understanding	of	socialization	has	implications	for	the	conditions	under	which	EU	contact	might	 contribute	 to	 the	 professional	 socialization	 of	 public	 officials	 in	 CEECs.	First,	we	essentially	define	professional	 socialization	as	 a	positive	 change	of	 attitudes	towards	the	principle	of	merit-based	civil	service	governance	thanks	to	EU	contact.			Second,	we	focus	on	professional	socialization	in	the	context	of	an	official’s	day-to-day	job.	 This	 means	 that	 we	 do	 not	 study	 professional	 socialization	 in	 the	 context	 of	education	and	training	prior	to	joining	public	administration,	even	though	these	might	be	important	periods	for	the	professional	socialization	of	civil	servants.2			Moreover,	we	do	not	focus	on	EU	initiatives	to	directly	‘promote’	the	professionalization	of	public	administration	in	new	member	states.	The	European	Social	Funds	(ESF)	are	a	recent	 example	 here.	 Since	 the	 period	 2007–2013	 they	 include	 projects	 that	 aim	 to	strengthen	administrative	capacity;	for	instance,	via	funding	provided	for	the	training	of	public	sector	employees.	For	the	pre-accession	period,	we	might	refer	to	Twining	as	an	instrument	 that	 came	 close	 to	 an	 external	 public	 administration	 professionalization	program	for	CEECs	(Papadimitriou	and	Phinnemore,	2004).			Our	 perspective	 differs	 in	 that	we	 focus	 on	 EU-related	 professional	 socialization	 that	might	occur	in	the	context	of	day-to-day	activities.	Specifically,	we	are	interested	in	the	effect	 of	 routine	 jobs	 that	 involve	 contact	 with	 the	 EU	 and	 have	 professional	socialization	as	a	by-product	rather	than	an	intentional	consequence.		
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	Third,	 our	 focus	 on	 the	 cognitive	 dimension	 of	 attitude	 change	 implies	 that	 for	 EU	contact	 to	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 professional	 socialization,	 officials	 must	 have	 an	opportunity	 to	 acquire	 new	 information	 that	 involves	 direct	 or	 indirect	 references	 to	merit-based	 civil	 service	 governance.	This	 condition	 is	 not	 easily	met	because	 the	EU	has	no	acquis	communautaire	on	civil	service	management,	which	remains	a	prerogative	of	 member	 states,	 and	 there	 are	 hence	 no	 EU	 directives	 and	 regulations	 that	 would	stipulate	the	institutionalization	of	merit-based	civil	service	governance	in	CEECs.			The	question	therefore	arises	how	contact	with	the	EU	in	the	context	of	officials’	day-to-day	 work	 provides	 information	 that	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 update	 their	 attitudes	regarding	personnel	management.	In	the	remainder	of	this	section	we	discuss	two	types	of	 EU	 contact	 that	 involve	 references	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 merit-based	 civil	 service	governance.	 The	 first	 type	 of	 contact	 focuses	 on	 information	 involved	 in	 handling	EU	rules	and	procedures.	The	second	type	of	contact	refers	 to	 information	resulting	 from	inter-personal	 contact	with	EU	officials	 and	 colleagues	 from	other	EU	member	 states.	We	will	 conclude	 the	discussion	with	one	general	and	 two	specific	hypotheses	on	 the	impact	of	EU	contact	on	professional	socialization.			
Two	types	of	EU	contact	and	their	impact	on	meritocratic	attitude	change			When	 looking	more	 closely	 at	 the	 daily	 tasks	 of	 officials	who	work	 on	 EU	 policies,	 it	quickly	becomes	evident	 that	 they	do	not	merely	deal	with	 the	substantive	content	of	policies,	but	they	also	have	to	pay	a	great	deal	of	attention	to	their	procedural	aspects.	The	 concept	 of	 the	 European	 Administrative	 Space,	 for	 instance,	 implies	 that	 EU	
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legislation	embodies	principles	such	as	public	administration	based	on	the	rule	of	law,	legal	 accountability,	 transparency	 and	 efficiency,	 as	 well	 as	 basic	 principles	 of	 civil	service	governance	such	as	impartiality,	political	neutrality,	openness,	and	meritocratic	recruitment	and	promotion	(Hofmann,	2008;	OECD,	1999;	Trondal	and	Peters,	2013).3			The	 importance	 of	 the	 procedural	 dimension	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 EU	 policies	 is	recognized	by	studies	of	EU	external	governance	(Freyburg	et	al.,	2009).	These	studies	emphasize	 the	 implications	 of	 EU	 contact	 stemming	 from	 regular	 work	 with	 EU	directives	 for	 the	 transfer	 of	 democratic	 norms	 to	 non-member	 countries.	Our	 article	takes	 a	 similar	 perspective,	 in	 that	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 administrative	 dimension	 of	 the	contact	that	national	officials	have	with	the	EU	acquis.				In	 the	 context	 of	 their	 job,	 officials	 first	 come	 into	 closer	 contact	 with	 European	principles	of	public	administration	when	they	start	working	on	EU	issues;	that	is,	when	they	 are	 given	 their	 new	 job	 description.	 The	 job	 induction	 as	 provided	 by	 their	superior	gives	the	official	new	information	that	has	the	potential	to	lead	to	a	change	of	attitude.	 The	 daily	 work	 on	 EU	 policies	 subsequently	 reinforces	 interaction	 with	information	 that	 embodies	 principles	 associated	 with	 the	 European	 Administrative	Space.			To	be	 sure,	 EU	 legislation	 varies	 in	 the	 extent	 to	which	 it	 has	 the	potential	 to	 inform	officials	in	relation	to	the	appropriateness	of	meritocratic	civil	service	management.	In	some	 cases,	 EU	 directives	 are	 fairly	 explicit.	 For	 instance,	 directives	 that	 address	 the	establishment	of	 regulatory	bodies	and	 the	employment	of	 inspectors	 tend	 to	refer	 to	the	need	for	 ‘qualified	staff’,	which	resonates	closely	with	the	principle	of	meritocratic	
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recruitment.	More	importantly	for	our	argument,	there	are	many	directives	that	provide	indirect	 cues	 for	 the	 appropriate	 methods	 of	 selection	 and	 promotion	 of	 staff.	 For	instance,	 the	 EU’s	 public	 procurement	 directives,	 which	 cut	 across	 the	 entire	 public	administration	 of	 member	 states,	 clearly	 lay	 out	 the	 principles	 of	 equal	 treatment,	transparency	and	non-discrimination	to	determine	the	award	of	contracts.4			Our	 argument	 assumes	 that	 officials	will	 use	 this	 kind	 of	 information	 to	 update	 their	evaluation	 of	 different	 approaches	 to	 personnel	 management.	 That	 is,	 officials	 are	expected	to	make	an	inference	from	the	appropriate	selection	of	contracts	in	the	area	of	procurement	 –	 as	 one	 high-profile	 example	 –	 to	 the	 appropriate	 management	 of	personnel	 in	 public	 administration.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 for	 EU	legislation	to	stipulate	the	principles	of	meritocratic	recruitment	and	promotion,	but	it	is	a	requirement	that	the	execution	of	EU	policies,	even	after	transposition	into	national	law,	 is	 based	 on	 principles	 that	 are	 compatible	 with	 merit-based	 civil	 service	governance.			We	 further	 assume	 that	 the	 transmission	 of	 information	 supports	 change	 in	 the	direction	of	more	(rather	than	less)	meritocratic	attitudes.	The	bureaucratic	hierarchy	and	the	nature	of	the	job	description	require	officials	to	take	in	the	new	requirements	of	their	day-to-day	work.	Officials	also	have	an	 incentive	 to	actively	 learn	 to	operate	 the	new	 rules,	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 do	 so	 is	 likely	 to	 affect	 their	 advancement	 in	 the	 job.	Moreover,	social	psychologists	refer	to	various	mechanisms	of	attitude	change	including	the	 ‘repetition	 effect’,	 which	 assumes	 that	 continuous	 exposure	 to	 a	 message	 will	gradually	lead	to	familiarization	and	hence	an	updating	of	attitudes	in	accordance	with	the	message	(Cacioppo	and	Petty,	1979,	Eagly	and	Chaiken,	1993).	The	continuous	work	
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on	 EU	 issues	 should	 therefore	 facilitate	 meritocratic	 attitude	 change	 and	 reinforce	support	among	those	who	are	already	relatively	meritocratic	in	their	attitude	profile.			Our	second	type	of	EU	contact	focuses	on	the	experience	of	officials	whose	job	involves	regular	 personal	 contact	 and	 direct	 exchanges	with	 EU	 officials	 and	 officials	 of	 other	member	states;	for	instance,	in	the	context	of	participation	in	working	group	meetings	organized	by	the	European	Commission	and	the	Council	(Beyers,	2005;	Egeberg,	1999).	The	importance	of	inter-personal	contact	has	been	explored	in	studies	of	international	socialization	 and	 European	 identity	 formation.	 Freyburg	 (2015),	 for	 instance,	 shows	that	participation	 in	 trans-governmental	networks	 in	 the	context	of	 the	EU’s	 twinning	program	had	an	important	effect	on	democratic	attitude	change	among	Moroccan	state	officials.	In	contrast,	Sigalas	(2010)	examines	the	impact	of	inter-personal	contact	in	the	context	of	 the	ERASMUS	student	exchange	program.	He	 finds	 that	participation	 in	 the	exchange	program	does	not	promote	identification	with	the	EU.	Instead,	it	even	appears	to	reduce	support	for	European	integration.			Even	if	the	impact	of	inter-personal	contact	may	be	contested,	the	‘contact	hypothesis’	suggests	that	officials	whose	job	involves	regular	personal	contact,	communication	and	exchange	with	EU	officials	and	officials	from	other	member	states	might	develop	more	favorable	attitudes	towards	merit-based	civil	service	governance	than	officials	who	lack	this	 kind	 of	 contact.	 This	 expectation	 rests	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 information	acquired	via	personal	contacts	with	EU	officials	and	officials	from	other	member	states	in	 the	 context	 of	 bilateral	 coordination	 and	 participation	 at	 EU-level	meetings	 entails	references	 to	 professional	 standards	 in	 public	 administration.	 These	 references	 may	consist	of	conversations	about	ways	of	doing	things	in	public	administration	and	simple	
 12 
observations	about	how	public	administration	is	managed	at	the	EU	level	and	in	other	member	states.			Our	 two	types	of	EU	contact	are	well	captured	by	 the	distinction	between	 ‘reception-’	and	 ‘projection’-related	 EU	 activities	 proposed	 by	 studies	 of	 the	 Europeanization	 of	central	government	(Bulmer	and	Burch,	2009;	Mastenbroek	and	Princen,	2010;	Meyer-Sahling	and	van	Stolk	2015).	 ‘Reception’	 is	comparable	 to	 the	notion	of	 ‘downloading’	(Boerzel,	2002),	in	that	member	states	transpose,	implement	and	adapt	to	EU	policies	at	the	 national	 level.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 primarily	 captures	 contact	 with	 EU	 rules	 and	procedures	 in	 the	 context	 of	 officials’	 day-to-day	 job.	 Professional	 socialization	 then	primarily	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 form	 of	 learning	 via	 interaction	 with	 formal	 rules	 and	procedures	that	originate	at	the	European	level.			‘Projection’,	 by	 contrast,	 resonates	 closely	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘uploading’	 (Boerzel,	2002),	which	is	associated	with	activities	such	as	the	preparation	of	national	positions	at	 the	 domestic	 level,	 the	 participation	 in	 EU-level	 decision-making,	 and	 the	coordination	of	positions	with	other	member	states	(Egeberg,	1999).	Projection-related	activities	also	involve	a	procedural	dimension	but	they	differ	from	reception	in	that	they	further	 include	 a	 significant	 element	 of	 inter-personal	 contact	 with	 EU	 officials	 and	officials	from	other	member	states	within	the	EU	framework.			Summing	up,	we	distinguish	three	hypotheses.	The	first	hypothesis	refers	to	the	general	impact	 of	 EU	 contact	 on	 the	 professional	 socialization	 of	 public	 officials	 in	 CEECs.	 It	addresses	the	difference	between	officials	who	work	on	EU	issues	and	officials	who	do	not	 do	 so	without	 considering	 the	 kind	 of	 EU-related	work	 they	 are	 involved	 in.	 The	
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second	and	the	third	hypotheses	directly	address	the	distinction	between	our	two	types	of	 EU	 contact	 in	 order	 to	 identify	which,	 if	 not	 both,	 of	 the	 two	mechanisms	matters	more	for	EU-inspired	professional	socialization	of	officials.5			
H1:	 Public	 officials	 demonstrate	 more	 favorable	 attitudes	 towards	 merit-based	 civil	service	governance	if	they	work	on	EU	policies	(‘EU	work	hypothesis’).		
H2a:	 Public	 officials	 demonstrate	 more	 favorable	 attitudes	 towards	merit-based	 civil	service	 governance	 the	 more	 important	 reception-related	 EU	 activities	 are	 for	 their	daily	work	(‘EU	reception	hypothesis’).		
H2b:	 Public	 officials	 demonstrate	 more	 favorable	 attitudes	 towards	 merit-based	 civil	service	 governance	 the	 more	 important	 projection-related	 EU	 activities	 are	 for	 their	daily	work	(‘EU	projection	hypothesis’).	
	
	
Data	and	Operationalization	The	empirical	analysis	relies	on	a	survey	of	ministerial	civil	servants	in	CEECs	that	was	designed	by	the	authors	on	behalf	of	the	SIGMA	unit	of	the	OECD	(Meyer-Sahling,	2009).	It	 was	 conducted	 in	 2008	 by	 the	 authors	 and	 generated	 2586	 responses	 from	 seven	countries	 that	 joined	 the	 EU	 in	 2004,	 namely:	 Estonia	 (384),	 Hungary	 (172),	 Latvia	(300),	Lithuania	(203),	Poland	(427),	Slovakia	(743),	and	Slovenia	(357).		The	 survey	 was	 conduced	 as	 a	 web-based	 survey	 in	 local	 languages.	 Hence	 it	 was	difficult	to	control	precisely	which	persons	completed	the	survey.	In	order	to	minimize	
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problems	 in	 relation	 to	 determining	 survey	 respondents,	 we	 adopted	 the	 same	approach	for	the	distribution	of	the	survey	in	each	country.	In	the	context	of	a	research	mission	to	each	country,	we	explained	the	purpose	of	the	survey	to	the	heads	of	central	civil	service	management	institutions.	They	distributed	the	survey	link	together	with	a	short	explanation	to	the	responsible	HR	managers	of	eight	pre-selected	ministries,	who	were	 then	 asked	 to	 distribute	 the	 link	 to	 all	 civil	 servants	 employed	 in	 the	 core	structure	of	 their	ministry.	Based	on	 the	 insights	of	 studies	of	 the	Europeanization	of	central	government	(Mastenbroek	and	Princen,	2010),	we	included	a	mix	of	ministries	that	we	expected	to	focus	more	or	less	on	European	policies.			The	 target	 of	 eight	 ministries	 was	 not	 reached	 in	 Hungary,	 while	 more	 than	 eight	ministries	 were	 eventually	 included	 in	 Estonia,	 Latvia,	 Slovakia	 and	 Poland.	 The	differences	 largely	result	 from	the	 inability	 to	perfectly	control	 the	distribution	of	 the	survey	 link.	 It	 is	 also	 impossible	 to	 specify	 the	 response	 rate,	 as	 it	 is	 not	 known	how	many	 civil	 servants	were	 on	 the	 email	 list	 that	was	distributed	within	 the	ministries.	However,	checks	against	the	size	of	ministries	indicate	that	between	10	(Hungary)	and	30	 (Slovakia)	 percent	 of	 the	 staff	 employed	 in	 the	 targeted	ministries	 completed	 the	survey.	 In	order	 to	mitigate	 the	effects	of	 survey	non-response,	we	collected	personal	and	 contextual	 data	 about	 the	 respondents	 and	 control	 for	 them	 in	 the	 statistical	analyses.		The	survey	consists	of	 items	with	regard	to	the	personal	background	of	civil	servants,	their	attitudes	towards	various	principles	of	civil	service	governance,	and	their	contact	with	EU	policy-making	and	implementation.	Responses	were	measured	on	a	five-point	Likert	scale.	In	order	to	ensure	that	translations	were	accurate	and	that	the	meaning	of	
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survey	statements	was	unambiguous,	we	relied	on	cognitive	pre-testing	of	 the	survey	by	local	experts	and	representatives	of	civil	service	departments	(or	equivalent).				For	 the	 operationalization	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable,	we	 rely	 on	 four	 items	 from	 the	survey	 to	 derive	 an	 index	 of	 public	 officials’	 support	 for	 merit-based	 civil	 service	governance.	The	items	focus	on	(i)	open	competition	such	as	the	open	advertisement	of	job	vacancies,	(ii)	the	recruitment	of	the	best	and	brightest	candidates	as	a	proxy	for	the	principle	of	merit-based	recruitment,	(iii)	promotion	on	the	basis	of	performance	as	an	indicator	 of	 merit-based	 promotion,	 and	 (iv)	 the	 absence	 of	 political	 connections	 in	determining	 promotion	 decisions	 to	 indicate	 the	 principle	 of	 de-politicization.	 The	precise	formulation	of	the	questions	can	be	found	in	Online	Appendix	1.			The	items	were	chosen	based	on	their	scalability.	The	survey	included	24	questions	that	sought	 to	 capture	 the	 attitudes	 of	 respondents	 towards	 principles	 of	 civil	 service	governance.	We	 used	Mokken’s	 procedure	 to	 identify	 the	 scaling	 properties	 of	 these	items	(Mokken,	1971;	van	der	Ark,	2007).	The	strongest	scale	 includes	 the	 four	 items	mentioned	above.	The	scale	has	a	high	degree	of	concept	validity,	in	that	the	four	items	are	 commonly	 regarded	 as	 essential	 for	 a	 non-political,	 merit-based	 civil	 service	(Dahlström	et	al.,	2012;	Evans	and	Rauch,	1999).			We	measure	attitudes	towards	merit-based	civil	service	governance	on	a	standardized	scale	 that	was	 constructed	 from	 factor	 scores	 from	an	 ordinal	 Item	Response	Theory	model	(Baker	and	Kim,	2004;	Samejima,	1969)	normalized	to	have	a	mean	of	zero	and	a	standard	deviation	of	one.	The	dependent	variable	is	therefore	interpretable	in	terms	of	standard	deviation	units	of	meritocratic	attitudes.		
 16 
	While	 the	 standardized	 scale	 eases	 the	 interpretation,	 it	 abstracts	 away	 an	 important	insight:	 	 public	officials	 are	 in	 general	 very	 favorably	positioned	 towards	merit-based	civil	 service	 governance.	 A	 simple	 average	 of	 the	 four	merit	 questions	 scored	 from	0	(strongly	disagree)	 to	4	 (strongly	agree)	assigns	 the	highest	 score	of	3.62	 to	Hungary	and	the	lowest	score	of	3.19	to	Slovakia.	This	is	in	itself	an	important	finding,	as	it	has	frequently	 been	 argued	 that	 (politicized	 and	 non-meritocratic)	 attitudes	 and	‘mentalities’	 associated	 with	 the	 communist-type	 administration	 have	 persisted	 in	CEECs	 (Verheijen,	 2010).	 Yet	 there	 is	 also	 considerable	 within-country	 variation,	suggesting	that	there	is	information	in	the	responses	despite	the	possibility	of	officials	responding	in	the	‘socially	desirable’	manner	to	the	survey	questions.6			Online	 Appendix	 2	 shows	 the	mean	 support	 for	merit-based	 civil	 service	 governance	values	 for	 the	 region	as	 a	whole	 and	 for	 the	 seven	 countries	 individually.	They	 range	from	0.52	in	Hungary	to	-0.38	in	Slovakia.	The	differences	between	countries	are	likely	to	 account	 for	 a	 relatively	 large	 amount	 of	 attitudinal	 variation.	 These	 country	differences	 also	 provide	 a	 baseline	 for	 the	 interpretation	 of	 effect	 sizes	 for	 the	individual-level	variables.	Nevertheless,	 the	contents	of	Online	Appendix	2	 should	not	be	 over-interpreted,	 as	 country	 samples	 differ	 in	 size	 and	 in	 the	 number	 and	 kind	 of	ministries	that	are	included	in	the	analysis.				For	 the	operationalization	of	 the	 independent	variables	we	concentrate	on	 individual-level	data	taken	from	the	same	survey.	These	are:	whether	or	not	an	official’s	work	 is	affected	by	the	EU	and,	for	those	where	it	is,	the	importance	they	attach	to	‘projection’	versus	 ‘reception’	activities.	The	first	question	was	deliberately	kept	broad	in	order	to	
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distinguish	officials	who	do	not	deal	with	EU	 issues	 from	those	who	do	(regardless	of	the	 amount	 of	 time	 involved).	 Overall,	 53	 percent	 of	 the	 respondents	 answered	positively,	though	this	varied	from	40	percent	in	Slovenia	to	62	percent	in	Estonia.			In	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 projection	 and	 reception	 hypotheses,	 we	 constructed	 two	additional	 indices	 based	 on	 six	 items	 from	 the	 survey.	 These	 questions	 were	 only	answered	by	the	subset	of	respondents	who	first	answered	’yes’	to	the	question	about	whether	the	EU	affects	their	work.	The	sample	for	the	assessment	of	this	hypothesis	is	hence	smaller	(1375).	Officials	were	asked	to	rank	the	influence	of	the	EU	on	their	tasks	from	 very	 unimportant	 to	 very	 important,	 and	 responses	 demonstrated	 that	 officials	attach	different	degrees	of	importance	to	these	kinds	of	activities.	The	projection	index	includes	items	that	provide	an	opportunity	for	public	officials	to	engage	in	direct,	inter-personal	contact	with	officials	from	the	EU	and	other	member	states.	The	items	refer	to	the	 preparation	 of	 national	 input	 for	 EU-level	 meetings,	 participation	 in	 meetings	organized	by	 the	European	Commission	and	the	Council,	and	consultation	with	public	officials	from	other	EU	member	states	in	the	context	of	the	EU	framework.			The	reception	index	also	consists	of	three	items,	which	focus	on	procedural	aspects	of	policy-making	and	implementation	at	the	domestic	level.	They	refer	to	the	transposition	of	 EU	 policies	 into	 national	 legislation,	 the	 practical	 application	 and	 enforcement	 of	rules	 that	 originate	 at	 the	 EU	 level,	 and,	 generally,	 the	 need	 to	 take	 EU	 policies	 into	account	 at	 the	 level	 of	 national	 policy-making	 and	 implementation.	 Again,	 we	 used	Mokken’s	 (1971)	procedure	 to	 check	 the	 scalability	of	 the	 items	and	 constructed	 two	measures	capturing	the	type	of	EU	contact,	normalizing	IRT	factor	scores	as	before.			
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In	order	to	control	for	factors	that	may	have	influenced	sample	selection	and	to	improve	the	 precision	 of	 our	 analysis	 by	modeling	 other	 factors	 that	might	 affect	meritocratic	attitudes,	we	control	for	the	sex	and	the	age	of	officials,	whether	they	have	managerial	responsibilities	and	how	many	years	of	experience	they	have	in	public	administration.	The	 latter,	 like	 many	 of	 the	 control	 variables,	 is	 measured	 in	 bands.	 For	 these,	 the	results	below	show	the	dummy	variable	formulations	in	accordance	with	the	categories	that	were	provided	by	the	survey,	except	the	level	of	education,	for	which	we	reduced	the	number	of	categories.	While	the	survey	distinguishes	whether	a	degree	program	has	been	 completed	 or	 merely	 started	 but	 not	 completed,	 we	 assume	 here	 that	 a	respondent’s	experience	at	each	 level	of	education	 is	 the	relevant	causal	 factor	rather	than	the	attainment	of	the	degree	itself.	We	therefore	code	officials	who	completed	and	those	who	started	but	did	not	finish	a	degree	in	the	same	category.		We	 also	 include	 the	 number	 of	 West	 European	 foreign	 languages	 that	 respondents	know	well	enough	to	be	able	to	work	in	as	a	control	variable.	 In	the	survey,	 these	are	restricted	 to	 English,	 French,	 German,	 Italian	 and	 Spanish.	 The	 number	 of	 working	languages	is	intended	to	capture	the	increased	possibility	of	or	actual	exposure	to	other,	perhaps	more	meritocratic	working	practices,	alongside	accessibility	to	Western	public	policy	 debates	 and	 to	West	 European	media	 in	 general	 (for	 reference,	 see	 Freyburg,	2015;	Kern	and	Hainmueller,	2009).			We	further	control	for	education	at	a	foreign	university.	The	impact	of	study	abroad	is	subject	 to	 debate	 in	 studies	 of	 democratic	 socialization	 (Atkinson,	 2010;	 Freyburg,	2015).	 In	 our	 context,	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	 study	 abroad,	 particularly	 at	 Western	European	 universities	 as	 the	 main	 destination	 of	 students	 from	 CEECs,	 has	 brought	
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officials	 into	 contact	with	a	potentially	more	meritocratic	 culture	before	 they	entered	public	administration.	For	the	analysis,	we	used	a	survey	question	that	asks	whether	or	not	a	public	official	has	studied	abroad.	The	question	does	not	distinguish	the	country	in	which	the	respondent	studied	and	therefore	merely	provides	a	proxy	 for	contact	with	Western	 culture	 during	 their	 university	 education	 -	 and	 hence	 the	 potential	 for	 EU-related	socialization	before	embarking	on	a	career	in	public	administration.			Finally,	 as	 indicated	above,	 the	effects	of	 country	and	ministerial	working	 context	are	likely	 to	 be	 considerable.	 This	 control	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 findings	 of	 studies	 of	European	 socialization	 (Beyers,	 2005;	 Hooghe,	 2005,	 2012).	 Sectoral	 factors	 might	include	policy	 types	and	support	 through	EU	assistance	projects	such	as	 the	 twinning	program	in	the	years	before	accession	(Papadimitriou	and	Phinnemore,	2004).	Country-level	factors	include	national	administrative	traditions,	the	structure	and	content	of	civil	service	 laws	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 political	 competition	 (Grzymała-Busse,	 2007;	Neshkova	and	Kostadinova,	2012;	Painter	and	Peters,	2010).	Since	the	primary	focus	of	our	 study	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 EU	work	 on	meritocratic	 attitudes	 at	 the	 level	 of	 individual	officials,	we	do	not	explicitly	model	country-	or	sector-level	features	but	instead	model	them	 as	 fixed	 effects.	 Moreover,	 because	 the	 number	 of	 countries	 included	 in	 the	analysis	 is	relatively	small,	 it	would	be	difficult	 to	make	meaningful	generalizations	at	the	 country	 level.	This	 also	explains	why	we	did	not	use	a	multi-level	perspective	 for	our	 analysis.	 Finally,	 the	 survey	 contains	 selective	 non-response,	 leaving	 up	 to	 10	percent	of	some	variables	missing.7			
Results	Table	 1	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 fixed	 effects	 regressions	 predicting	 officials’	 levels	 of	
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support	 for	 non-political,	merit-based	 civil	 service	 governance.	 The	models	 enter	 the	categorical	 questions	 as	 dummy	 variables.	 The	 baseline	 categories	 for	 time	 in	 public	administration,	age	and	educational	level	variables	are	subjects	who	‘have	been	in	place	for	less	than	one	year’,	are	‘under	21’	and	whose	highest	level	of	educational	attainment	is	‘finishing	high	school’,	respectively.			The	models	provide	evidence	for	the	assessment	of	our	three	hypotheses.	Models	1	and	2	 address	 the	 effect	 of	 daily	 work	 on	 any	 kind	 of	 EU	 issue	 on	 officials’	 meritocratic	attitudes.	Working	on	the	EU	is	reliably	associated	with	increased	levels	of	support	for	merit-based	civil	service	governance.	If	the	combination	of	fixed	effects	for	country	and	institutional	 contexts	 and	 individual	 covariates	 is	 sufficient	 to	 remove	 or	 mitigate	confounding	we	can	interpret	the	positive	coefficient	of	EU	work	as	being	its	effect	on	meritocratic	attitudes.	Table	1	summarizes	the	estimated	effects	of	EU	work.		<insert	Table	1	about	here>		In	 model	 2	 we	 attempt	 both	 to	 reduce	 regression	 misspecification	 and	 to	 balance	covariates	by	applying	a	matching	analysis	using	propensity	 scores	 (Ho	et	al.,	2007).8	These	 scores	 are	 taken	 from	 the	 specification	 shown	as	model	5	 (Table	3),	which	we	discuss	further	below.9	In	addition	to	providing	another	more	flexibly	specified	estimate	of	 the	 average	 treatment	 effect,	 matching	 allows	 us	 to	 distinguish	 the	 effect	 of	 EU	contact	 on	 officials	 who	 would	 have	 been	 candidates	 for	 working	 on	 EU	 matters,	whether	or	not	they	in	fact	did	so	–	the	average	effect	of	treatment	on	the	treated	(ATT);	and	also	 the	effect	on	those	 that	would	 likely	not	have	worked	on	the	EU,	whether	or	not	 they	 did	 so	 –	 the	 average	 effect	 of	 treatment	 on	 the	 untreated	 or	 ‘control	 group’	
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(ATC).	While	the	three	effect	estimates	suggest	that	those	initially	more	likely	to	work	on	 the	 EU	 exhibit	 slightly	 larger	 effects	 than	 those	 unlikely	 to	 do	 so,	 these	 are	 not	statistically	reliable	differences.	In	all	cases	the	matching	estimates	are	consistent	with	those	of	the	regression	models.		In	addition,	models	1	and	2	show	that	experience	in	public	administration	is	associated	with	 more	 meritocratic	 attitudes.	 Officials	 who	 have	 between	 one	 and	 five	 years	 of	service	have	more	meritocratic	attitudes	relative	to	those	who	have	been	in	service	for	less	than	one	year.	This	suggests	that	professional	socialization	takes	place	in	the	early	years	after	joining	public	administration.			Table	 1	 further	 shows	 that	 officials	 with	 six	 and	more	 years	 of	 experience	 in	 public	administration	do	not	have	more	meritocratic	attitudes	than	officials	with	less	than	one	year	 of	 experience.	 We	 can	 only	 speculate	 here	 why	 this	 group	 appears	 to	 be	 less	supportive	 of	merit-based	 civil	 service	 governance.	 However,	most	 officials	 from	 this	cohort	 effectively	 joined	 the	 administration	 in	 the	 early	 2000s	 and	 earlier,	 i.e.	 before	civil	 service	 laws	 were	 either	 passed	 or	 brought	 into	 line	 with	 European	 principles	(Dimitrova,	2005).	Hence	they	were	not	exposed	to	merit-promoting	information	in	the	initial	phase	after	recruitment.	While	plausible,	we	would	need	more	and	other	data	to	substantiate	this	kind	of	cohort	argument.			Models	 3	 and	 4,	 shown	 in	 Table	 2,	 test	 how	 different	 types	 of	 EU	 work	 affect	 the	attitudes	of	officials	towards	merit-based	civil	service	governance.	When	distinguishing	projection-	from	reception-related	EU	activities,	the	models	show	that	only	reception	is	associated	 with	 meritocratic	 attitudes.	 Like	 meritocratic	 attitudes,	 projection-	 and	
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reception-related	activities	are	constructed	using	normalized	scores.	Model	3	therefore	suggests	 that	 a	 one	 standard	 deviation	 change	 in	 how	 important	 reception-related	activities	are	is	associated	on	average	with	a	little	under	a	tenth	of	standard	deviation	change	in	meritocratic	attitudes.	This	effect	is	small	but	reliable.			<insert	Table	2	about	here>		At	 first	 glance,	 this	 finding	 might	 be	 surprising.	 However,	 it	 is	 plausible	 when	 one	considers	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 information	 that	 officials	 are	 exposed	 to.	 In	 the	 case	 of	reception-related	work,	the	contact	of	officials	with	the	EU	is	primarily	based	on	rules	and	procedures.	The	 information	 is	highly	 formalistic.	 In	many	 respects	 it	 is	 selective	and	formulated	as	an	instruction	that	officials	are	supposed	to	learn	and	follow.			In	contrast,	officials	who	work	on	projection-related	issues	are	likely	to	have	access	to	more,	 and	 conceivably	 also	 more	 critical	 and	 more	 diverse,	 information.	 Even	 when	taking	into	account	a	highly	structured	work	context	such	as	the	EU,	personal	relations	with	 EU	 officials	 inevitably	 involve	 informal	 exchanges	 that	 might	 not	 always	 fit	 the	expectations	 associated	 with	 formal	 rules	 and	 procedures.	 Personal	 relations	 with	colleagues	will	also	provide	information	with	regard	to	the	diversity	of	administrative	practices	 across	 EU	member	 states.	Moreover,	 officials	 are	 expected	 to	 negotiate	 and	hence	 question	 rules	 and	 procedures	 in	meetings	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 rather	 than	merely	follow	them.			Models	 3	 and	 4	 also	 support	 the	 role	 of	 experience	 in	 public	 administration	 as	 an	additional	 individual-level	 determinant	 of	 support	 for	 merit-based	 civil	 service	
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governance.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 two	 models	 suggest	 that	 formal	 education,	knowledge	of	foreign	languages	and	education	at	a	foreign	university	are	not	significant	predictors	of	meritocratic	attitudes.			If	we	consider	the	propensity	score	model	(model	5)	used	to	compute	the	estimates	in	model	 2,	 then	 the	 role	 of	 these	 individual-level	 covariates	 becomes	 clearer.	 Table	 3	shows	 that	 officials	with	 a	Masters	 or	 a	 PhD,	 officials	 who	 have	 studied	 abroad,	 and	officials	who	know	a	greater	number	of	foreign	languages	are	more	likely	to	work	on	EU	issues.	 Further,	 Table	 3	 shows	 that	 female	 officials	 are	 less	 likely,	 while	 those	 at	 a	managerial	level	are	more	likely,	to	deal	with	EU	issues.			<insert	Table	3	about	here>		These	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 a	 two-part	 explanation	 of	 meritocratic	 attitude	change:	Initially,	officials	select	themselves	or	are	selected	for	EU	work	on	the	basis	of	their	abilities.	When	in	post,	a	subset	of	these	abilities	moderates	the	effects	of	contact	with	 EU	 rules	 and	 procedures.	 On	 this	 account,	model	 5	 suggests	 that	 in	 order	 to	 be	selected	for	work	on	EU	issues,	a	high	level	of	educational	attainment,	study	abroad,	and	a	working	foreign	language	are	all	important.	Once	an	official	then	starts	to	work	on	EU	topics,	 more	 causally	 proximate	 information	 related	 to	 day-to-day	 EU	 contact	contributes	to	the	development	of	meritocratic	attitudes	as	examined	in	models	1	to	4.			Clearly	 we	 cannot	 confirm	 the	 details	 of	 this	 interpretation	 without	 longitudinal	information	such	as	panel	data.	However,	the	account	appears	theoretically	reasonable	and	 the	 data	 are	 sufficient	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 significant	 and	 positive	 association	
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between	 working	 on	 EU	 matters	 and	 favorable	 attitudes	 towards	 merit-based	 civil	service	governance.		
Conclusion	This	 article	 has	 examined	 the	 impact	 of	 EU	 contact	 on	 professional	 socialization	 in	CEECs.	 It	has	concentrated	on	public	officials’	 change	of	attitude	 towards	merit-based	civil	service	governance.	Based	on	a	survey	of	ministerial	officials	 in	seven	CEECs,	our	analysis	has	shown	that	daily	work	on	EU	 issues	 is	associated	with	more	meritocratic	attitudes.	The	analysis	has	further	shown	that	officials	who	work	on	so-called	reception-related	EU	activities	 involving	 the	 transposition	and	 implementation	of	EU	policies	 at	the	domestic	level	are	more	supportive	of	merit-based	civil	service	governance.			We	did	not	find	consistent	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	regular	personal	contact	with	EU	 officials	 and	 officials	 from	member	 states	 -	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 regular	participation	in	Council	and	Commission	working	groups	at	the	EU-level	(i.e.	so-called	projection-related	 activities)	 -	 are	 associated	 with	 more	 meritocratic	 attitudes.	However,	for	the	prospects	of	professional	socialization	in	response	to	EU	contact,	this	finding	 need	 not	 be	 taken	 to	 imply	 bad	 news,	 because	 a	 much	 larger	 proportion	 of	officials	 tends	 to	work	 on	 reception-related	 activities	 compared	 to	 projection-related	activities;	 the	 latter	 usually	 being	 performed	 by	 a	 minority	 of	 officials.	10	As	 public	administrations	 of	 CEECs	 are	 integrated	 into	 the	 European	 Administrative	 Space	 we	should	therefore	expect	the	professionalization	of	staff	attitudes	steadily	and	silently	to	increase.			
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Our	 findings	 complement	 studies	 of	 democratic	 socialization	 in	 the	 European	neighborhood:	While	we	confirm	a	positive	effect	of	EU	contact,	we	do	not	find	support	for	 the	 argument	 that	 regular	 interaction	with	 officials	 from	 the	 EU	 and	 its	member	states	promotes	attitude	change	(Freyburg,	2011,	2015).	However,	these	studies	focus	on	 inter-personal	contact	 in	 the	context	of	EU	twinning	projects.	The	contact	 is	hence	project-based,	takes	place	 ‘at	home’	(i.e.	mainly	in	the	recipient	country	rather	than	in	Brussels),	 and	 the	 advisory	 role	 of	 officials	 from	 EU	 member	 states	 in	 relation	 to	officials	 of	 non-member	 states	 tends	 to	 imply	 a	 teacher/tutor-pupil/student	 relation	(for	 details	 see	 Freyburg,	 2015).	 The	 context	 of	 inter-personal	 contact	 in	 studies	 of	democratic	 socialization	 in	 the	European	neighborhood	 therefore	differs	 in	 important	respects	 from	 the	 kind	 of	 contact	 that	 projection-oriented	 officials	 experience	 in	 our	study.	 In	 fact,	 the	 context	 of	 twinning	 projects	 shares	 many	 features	 with	 our	understanding	of	reception-related	activities,	though	evidently	extended	by	an	element	of	personal	contact	with	officials	from	EU	member	states.			While	 the	 analysis	 has	 confirmed	 a	 positive	 effect	 of	 EU	 contact	 on	 professional	socialization	of	public	officials	in	CEECs,	we	must	recognize	that	the	effect	is	fairly	small.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 say	 how	 long	 it	 takes	 for	 public	 officials	 to	 take	 on	 more	meritocratic	attitudes	in	response	to	EU	exposure,	and	whether	they	persist	once	they	have	 been	 acquired.	 The	 separate	 analysis	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 experience	 in	 public	administration	 suggests	 that	 public	 officials	 change	 their	 attitudes	within	 a	 relatively	short	period	of	time	after	joining	the	civil	service.	If	the	same	logic	applies	to	the	impact	of	 EU	 contact,	 one	might	 expect	 a	 positive	 but	 small	 impact	within	 a	 relatively	 short	period	of	working	on	EU	issues.			
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The	 positive	 impact	 of	 EU	 contact	 on	 the	 professional	 socialization	 of	 officials	 comes	with	 a	 number	 of	 qualifications.	 While	 knowledge	 of	 attitudes	 towards	 public	administration	 provides	 important	 cues	 with	 regard	 to	 administrative	 behavior,	favorable	 attitudes	 towards	 merit-based	 civil	 service	 governance	 do	 not	 necessarily	imply	 that	 management	 practices	 are	 equally	 meritocratic.	 Studies	 of	 state	transformation	in	CEECs	routinely	refer	to	persisting	problems	of	party	patronage	and	state	exploitation	(Gryzmala-Busse,	2007;	Kopecky	and	Spirova,	2011).	Yet	the	focus	on	attitudes	indicates	that	public	officials	are	generally	very	supportive	of	merit-based	civil	service	 governance.	 This	 implies	 support	 from	 public	 officials	 for	 administrative	reforms	that	seek	to	 institutionalize	 the	merit	principle	 further.	However,	 the	relation	between	 officials’	 attitudes	 and	management	 practices	 is	 an	 area	 that	 requires	more	empirical	research	in	the	future.			It	 also	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 to	what	 extent	 the	 socializing	 role	 of	 the	 EU	 is	 similar	 for	other	regions	and	to	what	extent	we	might	be	able	to	attribute	a	similar	effect	to	other	international	organizations.	The	research	on	EU	external	governance	mentioned	above	suggests	that	one	might	expect	similar	patterns	of	EU-induced	professional	socialization	for	candidate	and	potential	candidate	states	from	the	Western	Balkans	and	possibly	also	countries	in	the	Eastern	and	Southern	neighborhood.	For	the	old	member	states,	there	has	been	much	emphasis	on	the	resilience	of	public	administration	due	to	the	strength	of	 administrative	 traditions	 and	 national	 institutions	 (e.g.	 Knill,	 2001).	 In	 CEECs,	administrative	 traditions	 tend	 to	 be	 less	 entrenched	 (Meyer-Sahling	 and	 Yesilkagit,	2010;	Zubek	and	Staronova,	2012).	Public	administration	in	CEECs	might	therefore	be	more	receptive	to	the	socializing	influence	of	the	EU	than	it	is	in	the	old	member	states.	
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However,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 EU	 has	 a	 differential	 effect	 on	 the	 professional	socialization	of	public	officials	will	have	to	be	the	subject	of	future	research.			Future	research	might	also	want	to	examine	the	extent	to	which	the	socializing	effect	of	the	 EU	 differs	 from	 that	 of	 other	 international	 organizations.	 NATO	 enlargement,	 for	instance,	has	been	studied	with	regard	to	democratic	socialization	(Gheciu,	2005),	but	it	remains	 to	 be	 seen	 whether	 a	 similar	 effect	 can	 be	 identified	 for	 the	 professional	socialization	 of	 officials	 such	 as	 the	 civilian	 staff	 of	 defense	 ministries.	 The	 scope	 of	NATO	 exposure	 is	much	 smaller	 than	 for	 the	 EU,	 as	 a	 result	 of	which	we	might	 find	pockets	 of	 professionalization	 as	 long	 as	 we	 can	 identify	 similar	 mechanisms	 of	socialization	 through	 contact	 with	 rules	 and	 procedures	 stemming	 from	 NATO	membership.	 Similar	 questions	 might	 be	 asked	 for	 the	 impact	 of	 other	 international	organizations	 such	 as	 the	 OECD	 and	 the	World	 Trade	 Organization.	While	 smaller	 in	scope	and	potentially	different	 in	mechanism,	 it	will	be	a	matter	of	 future	research	 to	assess	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 professional	 socialization	 of	 public	 officials	 in	 CEECs	 and	elsewhere.				
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                                                1.	Egeberg	(1999)	and	Trondal	et	al.	(2008)	also	broadly	fall	into	this	strand	of	research.	2.	The	role	of	pre-socialization	has	received	plenty	of	attention	in	studies	of	European	socialization	(Beyers	2005;	Hooghe,	2005,	2012).	3.	The	meaning	of	European	Administrative	Space	(EAS)	remains	subject	to	debate.	Trondal	and	Peters	(2013:	295)	refer	to	EAS	as	the	‘institutionalization	of	common	administrative	capacity	at	a	‘European	level’.	It	includes	the	‘co-optation’	of	administrative	sub-centers,	including	national	administrations,	into	a	‘multi-level,	nested	network	administration’.	This	formulation	is	compatible	with	our	focus	on	legal	principles,	rules	and	regulations	that	originate	at	the	European	level	and	from	interaction	between	the	administrations	of	EU	member	states.	4.	For	details,	see	Directives	2004/17/EC	and	2004/18/EC.	They	have	recently	been	revised	(2014)	and	will	have	to	be	transposed	by	member	states.	The	change	does	not	affect	the	argument	developed	in	this	paper.	5.	Our	hypotheses	concentrate	on	the	impact	of	‘types’	rather	than	the	‘degree’	of	EU	contact	on	professional	socialization.	The	focus	takes	into	account	findings	by	Beyers	(2005,	2010)	who	examined	in	detail	the	impact	of	the	intensity,	duration	and	frequency	of	EU	contact.	He	concluded	that	the	quality	rather	than	quantity	of	contact	matters	for	socialization.	6.	We	acknowledge	that	responses	may	be	upwardly	biased	for	reasons	of	social	desirability.	However,	it	should	be	noted,	first,	that	answers	differ	considerably	both	within	and	across	countries	and	second,	that	our	effects	depend	only	upon	this	variation	and	not	its	absolute	level.	Moreover,	while	we	see	contextual	variation	in	response	levels,	our	fixed	effects	prevent	these	from	affecting	our	overall	socialization	effect	estimates	(see	also	below).	7.	In	the	analyses,	missing	data	were	imputed	using	the	Amelia	II	software	for	R	(King	et	al.,	2001)	and	quantities	of	interest	are	reported	by	combining	estimates	from	five	imputed	datasets	according	to	Rubin	(1987).	8.	The	matching	package	for	R	(Sekhon,	2011)	was	used	for	the	analysis.	9.	For	model	2,	separate	propensity	score	models	are	estimated	for	each	of	the	multiply	imputed	data	sets	and	only	the	final	estimates	are	combined.	10.	For	details,	see	Mastenbroek	and	Princen	(2010)	and	Meyer-Sahling	and	van	Stolk	(2015).	
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Tables	
	
	
Table	1.	Impact	of	daily	EU	work	on	support	for	merit-based	civil	service	governance.	 	 	 Model	1	 Model	2	EU	work		 	 0.16***	 0.20***		 	 (0.04)	 (0.05)	Time	in	public	administration		 1	–	2	years			 0.23**	 		 	 (0.08)	 		 3	–	5	years		 0.14*	 		 	 (0.07)	 		 6	–	10	years		 0.07	 		 	 (0.08)	 		 11	–	15	years		 0.04	 		 	 (0.09)	 		 More	than	15	years		 0.05	 		 	 (0.09)	 	Manager	 	 0.04	 		 	 (0.05)	 	Education		 Professional		 0.17	 		 	 (0.20)	 		 BA	 0.10	 		 	 (0.14)	 		 MA	 0.28*	 		 	 (0.14)	 		 PhD	 0.25	 		 	 (0.15)	 		 Other		 -0.04	 		 	 (0.14)	 	Educated	abroad	 	 0.03	 		 	 (0.05)	 	Languages	 	 0.02	 		 	 (0.03)	 	Age		 21	–	30		 -0.05	 		 	 (0.31)	 		 31	–	40		 -0.04	 		 	 (0.32)	 		 41	–	50		 -0.06	 		 	 (0.32)	 		 51	–	60		 -0.02	 		 	 (0.32)	 		 Over	60		 -0.01	 		 	 (0.34)	 	Female	 	 0.06	 		 	 (0.04)	 	R2	 	 0.13	 	Adj.	R2		 	 0.11	 	Num.	obs.	 	 2586	 2586	
Note: Two models of the effect of working on the EU on meritocratic attitudes. Model 1 is a linear regression 
model with fixed effects. Model 2 is a matching analysis using propensity scores and targeting the average 
treatment effect. Standard errors are from Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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Table	2.	Impact	of	two	types	of	EU	contact	on	support	for	merit-based	civil	service	governance. 	 	 Model	3	 Model	4	EU	work		 Projection		 0.00	 		 	 (0.03)	 		 Reception		 	 0.08**		 	 	 (0.03)	Time	in	public	administration		 1	–	2	years			 0.28**	 0.28**		 	 (0.10)	 (0.10)		 3	–	5	years		 0.21*	 0.20*		 	 (0.09)	 (0.09)		 6	–	10	years		 0.12	 0.10		 	 (0.10)	 (0.10)		 11	–	15	years		 0.19	 0.18		 	 (0.12)	 (0.12)		 More	than	15	years		 0.13	 0.11		 	 (0.13)	 (0.13)	Manager	 	 0.05	 0.04		 	 (0.06)	 (0.06)	Education		 Professional		 0.25	 0.24		 	 (0.43)	 (0.42)		 BA	 0.12	 0.07		 	 (0.25)	 (0.25)		 MA	 0.38	 0.33		 	 (0.25)	 (0.25)		 PhD	 0.34	 0.28		 	 (0.26)	 (0.26)		 Other		 0.07	 0.02		 	 (0.26)	 (0.26)	Educated	abroad	 	 0.04	 0.05		 	 (0.06)	 (0.06)	Languages	 	 0.02	 0.02		 	 (0.04)	 (0.04)	Age		 21	–	30		 -1.28	 -1.20		 	 (0.68)	 (0.68)		 31	–	40		 -1.32	 -1.24		 	 (0.69)	 (0.68)		 41	–	50		 -1.48*	 -1.41*		 	 (0.69)	 (0.69)		 51	–	60		 -1.35	 -1.28		 	 (0.69)	 (0.69)		 Over	60		 -1.34	 -1.29		 	 (0.70)	 (0.70)	Female	 	 0.02	 0.01		 	 (0.05)	 (0.05)	R2	 	 0.12	 0.13	Adj.	R2		 	 0.10	 0.10	Num.	obs.	 	 1375	 1375	
Note: Two models of the effect of the importance of projection or reception activities on meritocratic attitudes 
for those respondents working on the EU. 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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Table	3.	Propensity	to	work	on	EU	issues. 		 	 Model	5	Time	in	public	administration		 1	–	2	years			 0.04		 	 (0.04)		 3	–	5	years		 0.07		 	 (0.03)		 6	–	10	years		 0.06		 	 (0.04)		 11	–	15	years		 0.08		 	 (0.04)		 More	than	15	years		 0.12**		 	 (0.04)	Manager	 	 0.09***		 	 (0.02)	Education		 Professional		 -0.14		 	 (0.09)		 BA	 0.05		 	 (0.06)		 MA	 0.16**		 	 (0.06)		 PhD	 0.27***		 	 (0.07)		 Other		 0.10		 	 (0.07)	Educated	abroad	 	 0.09***		 	 (0.03)	Languages	 	 0.11***		 	 (0.01)	Age	 21	–	30		 0.12		 	 (0.15)		 31	–	40		 0.14		 	 (0.15)		 41	–	50		 0.12		 	 (0.15)		 51	–	60		 0.04		 	 (0.16)		 Over	60		 0.08		 	 (0.16)	Female	 	 -0.09***		 	 (0.02)	R2	 	 0.13	Adj.	R2		 	 0.12	Num.	obs.	 	 2586	
Note:	Propensity	score	model	predicting	whether	a	respondent	works	on	EU	matters.	In	this	linear	model	(Angrist	and	Pischke,	2009)	coefficients	are	interpretable	directly	as	predicted	increase	in	the	probability	of	working	on	the	EU	for	a	one	unit	change	in	 independent	variable.	(Results	do	not	differ	with	 logit	or	probit	specifications.)	
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
